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We give two procedures for determining whether eﬃcient Pareto improv-
ing local changes are possible. When they are, the procedures compute for
them. Any procedure generating eﬃcient and Pareto improving changes
can be replicated by these procedures. The two programs form a striking
duality. We apply the procedures to Pareto improving exchange processes,
Pareto-improving tariﬀ-tax reforms and to the problem of constrained Pareto
optimum where informational constraints are present.
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JEL Classiﬁcation: C61, C78, D51, D82, H211I n t r o d u c t i o n
Suppose that representatives from n countries negotiate piecemeal changes in
multilateral tariﬀs. If they fail to reach an agreement, status quo prevails. A
reasonable requirement of any agreement is that all participants beneﬁtf r o m
the change. If larger tariﬀ changes are more costly, whether economically
or politically, it is desirable that such changes are eﬃcient also. There are
usually many eﬃcient Pareto improving directions of changes when Pareto
improving changes are possible. An equity criterion further narrows the
choices. A large country may argue that it should beneﬁtm o r et h a ns m a l l e r
countries. One way to express the equity considerations is through the share
ratios of the total increase in aggregate welfare that goes to individuals. The
MDP exchange process [4], [12] is such a process. Another way is through
the exponents in the generalized Nash product of beneﬁt increases[13].
If the share ratios of the aggregate welfare increase are prescribed, one can
attempt to ﬁnd an eﬃcient local change that produces the share ratio. We
m o d i f yam e t h o di nY u n[ 2 5 ]a n du s ei tt ot e s tw h e t h e rt h e r ei sa ne ﬃcient
and Pareto improving local change that generates the share ratios and to
compute the direction when it exists. If positive exponents are chosen in the
generalized Nash product, we maximize the product over Pareto improving
changes of unit length. When a Pareto improvement is possible, the product
1is maximized at a unique eﬃcient and Pareto improving direction.
We represent the feasible local changes by a non-empty, closed convex
cone K in Rl and criteria by vectors {vi}n
i=1 in Rl. We interpret {vi} as the
gradients of some criteria functions. A local change d in K is
improving if vi · d>0, all i. When there is a Pareto improving change, d
∈ K\{0} is eﬃcient if there does not exist d0 ∈ K of equal size (|d0| = |d|)
such that vi · d0 >v i · d, for all i.
Denote the standard unit simplex in Rn as ∆ ≡ {x ∈ Rn|x ≥ 0,
P
xi =1 }
and its relative interior as ∆◦ and the unit disk in Rl by D ≡ {d ∈ Rl|d·d ≤
1}. Given v in Rl,π K v is the orthogonal projection of v to K.
Consider the following two problems:
Program 1. Given positive numbers {ci},i=1 ,··· ,n,
min
λ∈∆





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
. (1)
Program 2. Given λ in ∆◦,
max
d
Πi (vi · d)
λi
subject to d ∈ K ∩ D, vi · d ≥ 0,i =1 ,··· ,n.
The two problems share criterion vectors {vi} and the feasible directions K.
2The positive numbers {ci} specify the ﬁrst problem and the positive expo-
nents {λi} s p e c i f yt h es e c o n d .T h em i n i m u mo fp r o g r a m1o rt h em a x i m u m
of program 2 is zero if and only if a Pareto improving change does not exist.
A solution to either program gives a Pareto improving and eﬃcient change
when a Pareto improvement is possible. Conversely, given any Pareto im-
proving and eﬃcient local change, one can specify program 1 or Program 2
in such a way that the given direction solves the problems. The two pro-
grams form a striking duality. Suppose program 1 is deﬁned with positive
{ci},where c =( c1,··· ,c n) is positively proportional to ( 1
s1,··· , 1
sn)f o rs o m e
s ∈ ∆◦ and it has a strictly positive solution λ. If we deﬁne program 2 with
the exponents {λi}, then the solution d yields share ratios s, i.e., si =
vi·d P
i vi·d,
each i. Conversely, suppose program 2 is deﬁn e dw i t hp o s i t i v ee x p o n e n t s
λ ∈ ∆ and the solution d yields share ratios {si}. Then, if program 1 is
deﬁned with c, that is positively proportional to ( 1
s1,··· , 1
sn), {λi} is a solu-




sivi given by the solution λ
of the program 1 is positively proportional to the solution d of the program
2. When there is a single function f whose gradient is v, the duality reduces
to the fact that f increases fastest in the direction of the projected gradient
πK v.
Figures 1 - 3 illustrate the above programs and their duality when n =2 ,
K = R2 and c1 = c2 =1 . In Figure 1, two gradients v1 = a =( 3
4, 5
4),v 2 = b =
3(7
4, 1
4) are shown. The vector v =( 1 ,1) = 3
4a + 1
4b solves the ﬁrst program.
Since v is orthogonal to a − b, a · v = b · v>0. So, the share ratios are
s =( 1
2, 1
2). The arc connecting e to f (excluding e or f)c o n s i s t so fv e c t o r si n
the unit circle that form acute angles with both a and b. The inner product
of the vectors on the arc with a and b respectively are plotted by the heavy
curve in Figure 2. The part of the heavy curve in Figure 2 connecting A to B
is ‘eﬃcient.’ The eﬃcient part is obtained by taking the vectors on the unit
circle between a and b in Figure 1 and taking inner products with a and b.I f




4 by choosing d among unit vectors, we reach
the maximum at C in Figure 2 at d =(1 √
2, 1 √
2). At this direction of change,
a · d = b · d =
√






v = 3ê4a+ 1ê4b
f
Figure 1:



















5transports Figure 2 to Figure 1. Here, the level curve of w corresponding to
d =(1 √
2, 1 √
2),a 0 = 1 √
2a and b0 = 1 √
2b are shown. The gradient of lnw is equal






2b. Also, ( 1 √
2a − 1 √
2b) · d =0 . From the geometry given








¯ ¯ ¯ over
λ ∈ ∆. Thus, when c is positively proportional to ( 1
s1, 1




Dixit[5], Guesnerie[8],Turunen-Red and Woodland[21], study conditions
under which Pareto improving piecemeal tariﬀ and tax reforms exist. Weymark[20]
shows that when the tangent cone K is a half space of Rl and Dfi(x)w a sa
gradient of fi at x, i =1 ,···,n,a feasible direction is eﬃcient if and only if it
c a nb ee x p r e s s e da sπK
Pn
i=1 λiDfi(x) for some nonzero λ ≥ 0. When there
is one welfare function whose gradient is not zero, the gradient direction is
the only eﬃcient direction of change and is welfare improving. D’Aspremont
and Tulkens[4], Tirole and Guesnerie [18] use the gradient of a weighted
sum of welfare functions in studying exchange processes and tax reforms re-
spectively. When there are more than one maximand, the gradient method
gives an eﬃcient direction but is not necessarily Pareto improving. Tulkens
and Zamir[19] study local cooperative games with transferable utility in the
context of dynamic exchange processes.
We examine what an eﬃcient and Pareto improving exchange process
looks like in general. By varying the equity criterion, we can generate all
6eﬃcient and Pareto improving exchange processes. We show that the M70
p r o c e s si se ﬃcient while the MDP process is not. We then give an example of
at a r i ﬀ reform. Our method not only checks the feasibility of a particular type
of Pareto improving tariﬀ reform but it also computes, whenever possible,
the direction of an eﬃcient and Pareto improving tariﬀ reform corresponding
to a choice of equity criterion.
Next, we apply our analysis to models where information constraints are
present. In the standard principal-agent model, the principal has all the
bargaining power and the agent solves an optimization problem within the
principal’s problem (the incentive constraint). When both parties have some
bargaining power and when some constraints are informational, constrained
Pareto optimum — not Pareto optimum nor the principal’s solution — is the
relevant concept. We characterize a constrained Pareto optimum and show
how to ﬁnd (constrained) Pareto improving directions when the current po-
sition is not a constrained Pareto optimum.
1.1 Mathematical Preliminaries
As u b s e tA of Rl is a cone if v ∈ A, α > 0i m p l yαv ∈ A. For a non-empty
subset S of Rl, its (negative) normal cone is S− = {v ∈ Rl|v · w ≤ 0, for
all w in S}. Given a non-empty closed set C in Rl and x in C, the tangent
7cone is TC(x)={v ∈ Rl| there is a sequence {xi} in C converging to x and
a positive sequence {ti} decreasing to zero such that (xi − x)/ti → v}.T h e
tangent cone is non-empty, closed. If C is convex, TC(x) is convex. We often
write TC(x)− as NC(x). Suppose C and D are closed convex sets in Rl and
x ∈ C ∩ D. If TC(x) − TD(x)=Rl, then TC∩D(x)=TC(x) ∩ TD(x)a n d
NC∩D(x)=NC(x)+ND(x). The condition TC(x)−TD(x)=Rl is equivalent
to NC(x) ∩− ND(x)={0}([1],[24]).
Let K be a non-empty, closed convex cone in Rl. The orthogonal pro-
jection to K, πK, maps v in Rl t ot h eu n i q u ev e c t o ri nK minimizing the
Euclidean distance from v. For v ∈ Rl and c>0,π Kcv = cπKv and πK
is linear if K is a linear subspace. Given any v ∈ Rl, {v = w + z,w · z =
0,w ∈ K,z ∈ K−} has a unique solution {w = πKv, z = πK−v}.T h u s ,i f
w = πKv, v·w = w ·w and for d ∈ K, v ·d ≤ w ·d. Given d ∈ K, u ∈ NK(d)
if and only if u ∈ K− and u · d =0 . The functions v ∈ Rn 7→ |πKv| and
λ ∈ ∆ 7→ |πK
P
i λivi| are convex.
Given v, w in Rl, we write: v ∝ w if there is c>0 such that v = cw;
v>0i fv ≥ 0a n dv 6=0 ;v> >0i fvi > 0, all i;a n d|v| is the Euclidean
norm of v.
Let F be the cone of Pareto improving directions for some {vi}n
i=1 in Rl
and λ av e c t o ri n∆◦.I fF is not empty, d ∈ F → ln(v1·d)λ1(v2·d)λ2···(vn·d)λn
is a concave function. From this and the geometry of F, Program 2 has a
8unique solution when Pareto improving directions exist.
2M a i n R e s u l t s
Let K be a non-empty, closed convex cone of feasible changes in Rl.W h e n
there is a single objective function with the gradient v, a feasible change d
satisfying v · d>0 does not exist if and only if πK v =0 . When πK v is
not zero,π K v is the eﬃcient direction that improves the objective function.
Theorem 3 extends this observation to the case of n objective function in
terms of program 1 and program 2. Let {vi} be in Rl, i =1 ,··· ,n.
Lemma 1 A Pareto improving change does not exist if and only if there is λ
in ∆ satisfying πK
P
i λivi =0 . A Pareto improving change v ∈ K is eﬃcient
if and only if there is λ>0 such that v = πK
P
i λivi.
Proof. Suppose there is no d in K satisfying vi · d>0, all i. Applying
a necessary condition for a Pareto optimum [2][24],
P
i λivi ∈ K− or equiva-
lently, πK
P
i λivi =0f o rs o m eλ in ∆. Conversely, suppose there is λ in ∆
satisfying
P
i λivi ∈ K−. Since
P
i λivi · d ≤ 0 for any d in K, there cannot
be d in K satisfying vi · d>0, all i. If v ∈ K\{0} is eﬃcient, there is no
u in K such that |u| = |v| and vi · u>v i · v,a l li. A necessary condition
f o rt h i si s :T h e r ei s( λ,α) > 0 such that
P
i λivi − αv ∈ NK(v) [2][24], or
9equivalently,
P
i λivi − αv ∈ K− and (
P
i λivi − αv) · v =0 ( s i n c eK is a
closed, convex cone). Thus, v = πK(
P
i λivi − αv + v). For any λ>0,
P
i λivi / ∈ K− since a Pareto improving change is possible. Since NK(v) ⊂
K−,
P
i λivi / ∈ NK(v). We conclude that α cannot be zero. By choosing
α =1 ,v= πK
P
i λivi, where λ>0. Conversely, suppose v = πK
P
i λivi
for some λ>0. Since
P





i λivi − v = u, where u ∈ K− and v · u =0 . Consider
w ∈ K with |w| = |v|. Since (
P
i λivi − v) · v =0a n d(
P
i λivi − v) · w ≤ 0,
(
P
i λivi −v)·(w −v) ≤ 0. From v ·v ≥ v ·w, (
P
i λivi)·(w −v) ≤ 0. Thus,
it is not possible that vi · w>v i · v, all i.
Since the deﬁnitions of a Pareto improving change and an eﬃcient change
are independent of the lengths of {vi}, characterizations in Lemma 1 are
independent of them.
Lemma 2 Deﬁne program 1 with strictly positive {ci}. Then, λ ∈ ∆ is a
solution to program 1 if and only if (∗) v = πK
P
i λicivi satisﬁes civi·v ≥ v·v,
all i and civi · v = v · v whenever λi > 0. Assume that a Pareto improving
change exists and deﬁne program 2 with a strictly positive λ ∈ ∆. Then, d in
K, where |d| =1 , is the solution to program 2 if and only if (∗∗) vi · d>0





10Proof. Suppose that λ solves program 1 and let w =
P
i λicivi and v =






0 ∈ ∆, |v| ≤ |πK (w + t(civi − w))| ≤ |w + t(civi − w)) − u| =
|v + t(civi − w))| for each i and t ∈ [0,1]. The second inequality follows
since |πK (w + t(civi − w))| is the minimum distance from w + t(civi − w)
to K− and u is in K−. Thus, d
dt(v + t(civi − w)) · (v + t(civi − w))|t=0 =
2v · (civi − w) ≥ 0f o re a c hi. We have: civi · v ≥ w · v = v · v, all i. Since
P
i λicivi · v = w · v =
P
i λiv · v, λicivi · v = λiv · v, all i and civi · v = v · v






0 ∈ ∆. There are u, u0 in K− such that v =
P





icivi −u0,u 0 ·v0 =0 . Since u minimizes the distance from
P
i λicivi
to K− and [u0,u] ⊂ K−, d
dt(t(u0−u)−v)·(t(u0−u)−v)|t=0 = −v·(u0−u) ≥ 0.








icivi) ≥ v·v. The second in-
equality is from civi·v ≥ v·v and v·u =0 . Thus, |v||v0| ≥ v·v0 ≥ v·v = |v|·|v|,
implying |v0| ≥ |v|.
Next, suppose that d solves program 2. Since Pareto improvement is
possible, vi · d>0, all i. Since for α>0, Πi (vi · αd)λi = Πi α(vi · d)λi,





vi·dvi ∈ NC(d), where C = K ∩ D. We show that NC(d)=ND(d)+
NK(d). It is suﬃcient to show TD(d) − TK(d)=Rl, or equivalently, ND(d)
∩−NK(d)={0}.N o w ,ND(d)={cd|c ≥ 0} and NK(d)={u|u ∈ K−,u·d =
110}. If cd = −u for u ∈ NK(d)a n dc ≥ 0, then cd · u = −u · u =0 , implying




vi·dvi = γd + u where γ ≥ 0,u∈ K− and u · d =0 .





vi·dvi. Conversely, suppose (∗∗) holds and consider a Pareto












vi·dvi·(d0−d)=( d+u)·(d0−d) ≤ d·(d0−d) ≤ 0. The last two inequalities
follow from u · d0 ≤ 0,u· d =0a n df r o m|d0| = |d|.
C o m b i n i n gL e m m a1a n dL e m m a2 :
Theorem 3 Let v = πK
P
i λicivi, where λ is a solution of program 1. Then,
v =0if and only if a Pareto improving change does not exist. If v 6=0 ,i t
is eﬃcient and Pareto improving. If the maximum value at a solution d to
Program 2 is positive, d is non-zero, eﬃcient and Pareto improving. If the
maximum at a solution d to Program 2 is zero, a Pareto improving direction
does not exist and the zero vector is a solution.
Proof. From Lemma 1,v= 0 if and only if Pareto improving direction
does not exist and v is eﬃcient if Pareto improving direction exists. From
Lemma 2, v is Pareto improving since civi · v ≥ v · v>0, all i. Suppose
the maximum value of Program 2 is positive at a solution d. If there were
d0 ∈ K such that |d0| = |d| and vi ·d0 >v i ·d, all i, d would not maximize the
12generalized Nash product over the feasible set. Thus, d is eﬃcient. The rest
is clear.
Although Program 1 may not have a unique solution, the corresponding
direction πK
P
i λicivi is unique.
T h ec o n eo ff e a s i b l ec h a n g e sK need not be all economically feasible
directions but rather those the policy makers choose to restrict themselves
to. For example, the policy makers may test whether proportional reductions
of tariﬀs would increase welfare of all parties (Yun[23]).
Ac o n v e r s eo fT h e o r e m3i s :
Theorem 4 A non-zero v ∈ K is an eﬃcient, Pareto improving direction if
a n do n l yi ft h e r ea r ep o s i t i v en u m b e r s{ci},i=1 ,···,nand λ in ∆ satisfying
v = πK
P
i λicivi and civi · v = cjvj · v, all i,j. Program 1, deﬁned with {ci},
has λ as a solution and program 2, if deﬁn e dw i t has t r i c t l yp o s i t i v eλ, has
d = v
|v| as its unique solution.
Proof. Suppose that v ∈ K is an eﬃcient, Pareto improving direction.
By Lemma 1, there is α ∈ ∆ such that v ∝ w = πK
P
i αivi. We only
c o n s i d e rt h ec a s eo fw h e nv = w. There are u ∈ K−,u· v =0s u c ht h a t
v = −u+
P





ci =1( f o re a c hi, choose ai = v1·v





ai). Then, v = −u +
P
i λicivi, where λi ≡
αi
ci for each i and λ ∈ ∆.
13T h ec o n v e r s ef o l l o w sf r o mL e m m a1a n dv·v =
P
i λicivi·v = civi·v>0. By
Lemma 2, λ is a solution of the program 1 deﬁned with {ci}. Next, let d = v
|v|.





|v|vi ∈ K, where |d| =1a n dcivi · d = cjvj · d, all i,j.
Taking an inner product of d with both sides of the equation, 1=
ci
|v|vi ·d for




vi·dvi. By Lemma 2, d is the solution of program
2d e ﬁned with λ.
In a two person bargaining problem, a utility allocation is a Nash solu-
tion if and only if there is an aﬃne transformation of utilities such that the
solution in the new units is simultaneously the egalitarian and the utilitar-
ian solution. Myerson[13][16] considers a generalized Nash problem where
individuals may carry diﬀerent weights. In the present context, we have:
Corollary 5 A feasible direction d of unit length is eﬃcient and Pareto im-
proving if and only if there are positive numbers {ci},i=1 ,··· ,nand λ in
∆ such that d maximizes
P
i λici · v over v ∈ K ∩ D and civi · d = cjvj · d,
for each i,j.
Proof. By Theorem 4, d in K\{0} is eﬃcient and Pareto improving if and
only if there are positive {ci} such that d = πK
P
i λicivi and civi·d = cjvj ·d
for each i,j. For any v ∈ K∩D,
P
i λicivi·d = d·d =1≥ d·v ≥
P
i λicivi·v.
T h ec o n v e r s ef o l l o w ss i n c e1>d· v for v 6= d in the previous expression and
thus d is the unique maximzer of
P
i λicivi · v over v ∈ K ∩ D.
142.1 Share ratios of aggregate welfare improvements
A Pareto improving change d generates a share ratio s in ∆ where si =
vi··d P
i vi··d
for each i. When vi is the domestic price vector for the economy i in terms
of commodity l, vi · d represents the rate of increase of welfare measured in
commodity l in the economy. Given a strictly positive s in ∆, one can look
for an eﬃcient, Pareto improving change d generating the share ratio. If such






¯ ¯ ¯ over λ ∈ ∆.
The following feasibility condition shows when an eﬃcient, Pareto improving
direction d can generate a strictly positive share ratios s.





vi, for an λ in ∆. (b) vi · v = siv · v,all i.
(Condition F)
Condition F shows that the share ratio si is the Fourier coeﬃcients
vi·v
v·v in
projecting vi in the direction of v.
Lemma 6 An eﬃcient, Pareto improving direction d generates a strictly
positive share ratios s if and only if Condition F is satisﬁed.
Proof. We may replace the conditions in Theorem 4 by (a0) v = πK
P
i λicivi
and (b0) vi · v = civ · v, all i since v · v =
P
i λicivi = civi · v. An o n - z e r od
satisfying Condition F satisﬁes (a0), (b0)w i t hci = 1
si and generates s since
P
i vi·v = v·v. Conversely, if a non-zero d satisﬁes (a0)a n d( b 0) and generates
15s, then d satisﬁes Condition F with d = kv and si = k 1





The following duality theorem now follows from Theorem 4 and Lemma
6.
Theorem 7 If Program 1 is deﬁned with { 1
si} for some s in ∆◦ and has a




sivi 6=0 , then Problem 2, deﬁned with λ, has a
unique solution d that generates the share ratio s. Conversely, if Program 2
is deﬁned with λ in ∆◦ and has a Pareto improving solution d that generates
the share ratio s, then Problem 1, deﬁned with { 1
si}, has a solution λ. In both





Proof. Suppose that program 1 is deﬁned with { 1
si} for some s in ∆◦ and




sivi 6=0 . By Lemma 2, vi·v = siv·v,
all i. By Theorem 4, program 2 deﬁned with λ has d ∝ v as the solution
and thus generates s. If program 2 is deﬁned with λ in ∆◦ and has a Pareto











i vi · d)d. Since |d| =1 ,v· v =(
P
i vi · d)2 =
1
sivi · v. By Theorem 4, program 1, deﬁned with s, has a solution λ.
16Schematically:
program 1 program 2
given s (ci = 1
si) λ
determines λs










A Pareto improving direction given by Program 2 is invariant with respect
to the lengths of {vi}. This is clear since for any positive numbers {ci},
Πi(civi·d)λi = cΠi(vi·d)λi, where c = Πic
λi
i > 0. The invariance is important
since the lengths of {vi} may not be economically meaningful. Program 1,
by contrast, picks diﬀerent Pareto improving directions when the lengths of
{vi} are altered through multiplicative factors { 1
si}. A duality between the
procedures shows, however, that they are in a sense equivalent.
3 Applications and Examples
3.1 Exchange Processes
Consider an exchange economy with n traders and l(≥ 2) goods. The con-
sumption xi of trader i and the aggregate endowment ω are strictly positive
vectors in Rl. The consumption allocations are {x =( x1,··· ,x n)|x> >
170,
P
i xi = ω}. The utility function of trader i is ui(x) ≡ Ui(xi), whose gradi-
ents are strictly positive vectors vi and Vi. Then, vi =( 0 ,··· ,0,V i,0,··· ,0),
where Vi is the ith l-vector of vi.W en o r m a l i z e :|Vi| =1 , all i. T h ef e a s i b l ed i -
rections at a consumption allocation x is K =
©




whose normal is K− =
©
(r, ··· ,r) ∈ Rnl|r ∈ Rlª









































































3.1.1 exchange processes using program 1
Consider ﬁrst the case of equal division of the aggregate gain; si = 1
n, each
i. By choosing d = n2z and denoting e V ≡
P
i λiVi, (3) and (4) become









,i=1 ,··· ,n. From the
Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem, there is λ in ∆ solving the latter equations.









Vi − e V, i=1 ,··· ,n (5)
This process is Pareto improving (generates share ratios si = 1
n, each i)
whenever d 6= 0; that is, whenever Vi 6= Vj for some i,j. In the followings, we
assume that this is the case.
We present an eﬃcient and Pareto improving process where one needs not
solve for λ at each step. The process may be considered an approxima-










for each i. Then the process is given by (5). Since
V · V< 1a n d{Vi} are non-negative, λi > 0, all i. Also,
P
i λi =1a n d
P
di =0 . T h i sp r o c e s si se ﬃcient since d ∝ πK
P
λivi. It is Pareto improv-
ing since nVi · di =( 1− V · V )(1 − Vi · V )+1
n
³P
j(1 − Vj · V )Vi · Vj
´
> 0.






¯ ¯ ¯ < 1.
The MDP process [12] is an exchange process that can generate any pre-
scribed share ratios {si}. The price for such a ﬂexibility is that the pro-
cess is not eﬃcient in general. Consider the case of two traders and three
goods. Normalize the gradient of Ui by: πi(xi) ≡ DUi(xi)/DlUi(xi)a n d




i siπi and di =( d1
i,d 2
i). A c c o r d i n gt ot h eM D P
process, di = siΛ(πi − π)a n dd3
i = siw− πi · di,i=1 , 2w h e r eΛ is a
19diagonal matrix with positive entries and w ≡
P
i πi · di. Collecting the
terms, d1 = s1s2Λ(π1 − π2),d 3
1 = −s1s2(s2π1 + s1π2)tΛ(π1 − π2), d2 = −d1,
d3
2 = −d3
1. The aggregate welfare increase, w = s1s2(π1 − π2)tΛ(π1 − π2)i s
positive unless π1 = π2. We give an example where Λ is the identity ma-
trix and U1 = x1y1z1,U 2 = x2y2z2. Holdings of traders are: x1 =( 1 ,3,3),
x2 =( 3 ,1,1) and s1 = s2 = 1
2. The MDP process gives the rate of welfare
change (.888,.888). Process 5, with the same norm of the rate of exchanges,
gives the rate of welfare change (1.1178,1.1178).
3.1.2 exchange processes using program 2




vi·dvi (Lemma 2). Suppose




j λjcjVj, where ci = 1
Vi·di. Multiplying both sides of the equation with Vi
and writing b V =
P
j λjcjVj, 1=ci(λici − 1
nVi · b V ), for i =1 ,··· ,n. After
solving for positive numbers {ci}n
i=1 from these n equations, an eﬃcient,








j Vj, all i. Such a choice is indeed possible (λi =
1−Vi·V
n(1−V ·V ), all i). Thus, this
simple process, called the M70 process ([4]), is eﬃcient and Pareto improving.
203.2 A Numerical Example of Tariﬀ Changes
Consider an exchange international economy with two goods and two countries.
Good 2 is a numeraire and p1 is the world price of good 1 in terms of good














tries may impose speciﬁct a r i ﬀs on good 1 only. The tariﬀ by country i is
ti =( τi,0). Negative τi is subsidy. Domestic price vector in country i is
qi ≡ p + ti. Equilibrium conditions are: DUi(xi) ∝ qi,p· (xi − ωi)=0 ,





Endowments are: {ω1 =( 3 ,1),ω 2 =( 1 ,3)}. At a tariﬀ proﬁle of (τ1,τ2)=
(−0.05,0.05), the equilibrium consumption allocations are {x1 ≈ (2.30,1.48),x 2 ≈
(1.70,2.52)} and p1 is approximately 0.69. At the tariﬀ equilibrium, country
1 exports good 1 and subsidizes its export. Country 2 imports good 1 and
charges a tariﬀ on it. At the equilibrium, we compute an eﬃcient and Pareto
improving change in the allocation space. Turunen-Red and Woodland[?]
uses the Motzkin’s Lemma to test whether a particular Pareto improving
tariﬀ reform exists. Our method not only tests the possibility but also com-
putes for such a reform whenever they exist. The feasible allocations are
S = {(x1,x 2)|x1 ≥ 0,x 2 ≥ 0,x 1 + x2 = ω1 + ω2}. Given a strictly posi-
tive x =( x1,x 2), the tangent cone TS(x)i sK = {d =( d1,d 2)|d1 = −d2}.
21Deﬁning ui(x) ≡ Ui(xi),i=1 ,2, let v1 =( DU1(x1),0) ∝ (q1,0) and
v2 =( 0 ,DU 2(x2)) ∝ (0,q 2). For any choice of strictly positive λ1,λ 2 summing
to 1, maximizing ln(v1 · d)λ1(v2 · d)λ2 subject to d ∈ K, |d| ≤ 1i se q u i v a l e n t
to maximizing ln(q1 · d1)λ1(−q2 · d1)λ2 subject to |d1| ≤ 1 √
2. A necessary and




q2·d1q2 = d1. When {λ1 = 3
4,
λ2 = 1
4},d 1 is approximately (−0.575,0.412). In this computation, we just
used the knowledge of q1,q 2.
We can ask what tariﬀ changes will produce the change d.T h i si n v o l v e s
a general equilibrium computation that requires the knowledge of prefer-
ences around the current tariﬀ equilibrium. Instead, we consider the wel-
fare as a function of a tariﬀ proﬁle and compute an eﬃcient and Pareto
improving tariﬀ changes. Writing xi as a function of τ =( τ1,τ2), we
redeﬁne vi ≡ DUi(xi)Dxi(τ)
¯ ¯
τ=(−0.05,0.05) ,i=1 ,2. We compute: v1 ≈
(−0.210,−0.238),v 2 ≈ (0.159,0.115). S i n c ew ed on o ti m p o s ea n yr e s t r i c -
tion on the changes of tariﬀs, the tangent cone of feasible directions is R2
and its normal cone is {0}. Maximizing ln(v1 · d)3/4(v2 · d)1/4 subject to
d · d ≤ 1a n dvi · d ≥ 0,i=1 ,2, the unique solution is d ≈ (0.631,−0.776).
The welfare improvements are:{v1 · d ≈ 0.52,v 2 · d ≈ 0.11}.
Now, we choose c1 = 1
v1·d,c 2 = 1
v2·d and minimize |λ1c1v1 + λ2c2v2| over λ
in ∆. The solution is λ =( 3
4, 1
4). These are precisely the weights used in the
generalized Nash product.
223.3 Pareto improvement when informational constraints
are present
In the principal-agent framework, the principal has all the bargaining power
(see Grossman-Hart[[6]], Rogerson[[15]], Jewitt[[10]], for example). We may
ask what the Pareto optimal solutions are when both parties have some bar-
gaining power. Also, given a wage schedule w and associated action choice
a by the agent, the principal can consider a piecemeal changes to w that
produce Pareto improvement for both parties. We adopt Rogerson’s nota-
tion closely. With a ﬁnite possible outcomes for an eﬀort, the model is ﬁnite
dimensional. Let a ≥ 0a n dwj ≥ 0, for j =1 ,··· ,n. The expected util-
ity of the principal is given by: U(w,a)=
Pn
j=1 pj(a)u(xj − wj)a n dt h a t
of the agent by: V (w,a)=
Pn
j=1 pj(a)(v(wj) − a). Here, pj(a)i st h ep r o b -
ability that the jth outcome will occur when action a is chosen and xj is
the gross income to the principal in the event of the jth outcome. When








j(a)v(wj) − 1). We say that (w,a) ≥ 0i sP a r e t oo p t i -
mal if there is no (w0,a 0) ≥ 0 such that U(w0,a 0) >U(w,a)a n dV (w0,a 0) >
V (w,a). If (w,a) >> 0i sP a r e t oo p t i m a l ,t h e r ei sλ ∈ [0,1] such that




j(a)[λv(wj)+( 1− λ)u(xj − wj)] = λ. Now, suppose that (w,a)
needs to satisfy the participation constraint ((w,a) ∈ C1 ≡ {(w,a)|V (w,a) ≥
V } and an incentive constraint.((w,a) ∈ C2 ≡ {(w,a)|a ∈ argmaxV (w,·)}.
(We need to introduce participation constraint for the principal, as well.
We do not do so here for simplicity). While the wage schedule w needs
to be agreed upon by both parties, the action a is chosen by the agent.
The idea of constrained Pareto optimum repects this fact. We say that
(w,a) ≥ 0,(w,a) ∈ C ≡ C1 ∩ C2 is constrained Pareto optimal if there is no
(w0,a 0) ≥ 0, (w0,a 0) ∈ C1 ∩C2 such that U(w0,a 0) >U(w,a)a n dV (w0,a 0) >
V (w,a). A necessary condition that (w,a) is a constrained Pareto optimum
is: there is λ ∈ [0,1] such that λDV (w,a)+( 1− λ)DU(w,a) ∈ NC(w,a). A
constrained Pareto optimal (w,a) at which the participation constraint C1
is binding is the solution for the principal in the standard principal-agent
model. If the current allocation is not constrained Pareto optimal, we can
consider a constrained Pareto improvement in w. That is, how can the wage
schedule w be changed so that the welfare of both the principal and the agent
improve while satisfying the incentive constraint?
For a constrained Pareto optimum that is diﬀerent from a solution to the
principal’s problem, consider the case where the participation constraint is
not binding. We consider a simple case that the optimum a for the agent is
locally given by a diﬀerentiable function f;t h a ti s ,a = f(w), locally. As-
24suming Df(w) 6=0 ,T C(w,a)={(dw,Df(w)dw)|dw ∈ Rn} and NC(w,a)=
{(−cDf(w),c)|c ∈ R}. So, a necessary condition that (w,a) is a constrained
Pareto optimum is that there is λ ∈ [0,1] such that λDV (w,a)+( 1−
λ)DU(w,a)=( −cDf(w),c)f o rs o m ec ∈ R. Writing out: there is λ ∈ [0,1]




j(a)[λv(wj)+( 1− λ)u(xj − wj)] − λ = c. If (w,a)i s
not a constrained Pareto optimum, we can compute directions of change in
w that would Pareto improve U and V while respecting the incentive con-
straint. For this, ﬁrst compute c that makes
λDV (w,a)+(1−λ)DU(w,a)−c[−Df(w),1] orthogonal to [−Df(w),1]. De-
noting by c the value of such c, c = 1
|[−Df(w),1]|2 [−(λDVw(w,a)+( 1− λ)DUw(w,a))Df(w)+( λDV
Next let λ ∈ argmin |λDV (w,a)+( 1− λ)DU(w,a) − c(λ,w,a)[−Df(w),1]|.
Then, a Pareto improving change in w respecting the incentive constraint of
the agent is given by dw = λDwV (w,a)+(1−λ)DUw(w,a)+c(λ,w,a)Df(w).
If λ ∈ (0,1),Uand V improve at the same rate; dU = dV.
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